Beyond New START: Strategic reflections

THE future of arms control in an era ushering beyond the New START fundamentally hinges on whether Washington and Moscow can agree to a new bilateral treaty– addressing modern challenges like missile defense, hypersonic weapon and strategic stability. As there are no binding constraints after New START’s expiration, it appears unavoidable to include emerging technologies—including artificial intelligence and cyber capabilities—within future agreements between the nuclear powers. Needless to say, without renewed cooperation, nuclear risks may be crucially rising. Given the nuclear build-ups and stockpiles of both the US and Russia, it is necessary that they must engage constructively in a new framework that could be aligned to establish transparency, verification mechanisms and limits on disruptive systems, more importantly setting a precedent for arms control in the 21st century. Arms control has been a primary focus of international relations throughout the Cold war, the post-Cold War era and continues to be so in the current multipolar order. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was a significant bilateral treaty –between Washington and Moscow –entered into force on December 5, 1994 and concluded its reduction phase by December 5, 2001. It capped, among other things, 6,000 accountable warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers). In the same vein, The NEW START signed in 2010, remarkably capped the number of deployed strategic warheads for both the US and Russia to 1550 respectively. The treaty was officially expired on Feb 5, 2026, paving the way towards an unpredictable nuclear arms race between its signatories. From the US perspective, US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, argues, ‘’Arms control advocates and many voices in the media have tried to cast the expiration as a sign that the United States is initiating a new nuclear arms race. These concerns ignore that Russia ceased implementing the New START treaty in 202