Hard choices

ONE year has passed since India decided to hold the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance. Pakistan’s National Security Council issued a warning, shortly after the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security’s decision, that any attempt to divert water flows will be regarded as an “act of war”. A year later, there are no visible signs towards the treaty’s restoration, and it remains essentially paralysed. India has expedited development on a number of controversial hydropower projects by revising completion deadlines and making more rigorous funding arrangements. New Delhi has also approved design modifications in order to improve operational flexibility in managing water flows on several projects. Similarly, India has enhanced diversion measures at the Kishanganga project. The Indian National Register of Large (Specified) Dams lists 15 large (specified) dams in occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The Kiru, Kwar and Pakal Dul are among the projects that India has expanded on the Chenab tributaries. Additionally, India has upgraded local storage systems and canals while increasing irrigation planning and intra-basin water use. These actions will likely lead to a progressive decrease in downstream water availability and an increase in upstream demand. Since April 2025, all of New Delhi’s initiatives are meant to bring a change from a project-based approach to a water control strategy at the system level. Due to ongoing hydroelectric projects, India’s western river storage capacity could increase two to three times, which will greatly enhance its ability to manipulate water flows. India has expedited development on a number of controversial hydropower projects. The majority of these projects are anticipated to be completed between 2030 and 2032. To counter the Indian decision of suspending the IWT, Islamabad had to make a strategic decision: either persuade New Delhi to change its mind or force it to do so. Islamabad has so far preferred a multi-layered legal and diplomatic approach