China Is Squandering a Golden Opportunity

DAVID SHAMBAUGH is Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science, and International Affairs at George Washington University and Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. STEVEN F. JACKSON is Professorial Lecturer in Asian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. Why Beijing Has Failed to Exploit Trump’s Missteps Since returning to the White House in January 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump has bullied, scolded, and coerced countries the world over—alienating friends, neighbors, allies, competitors, adversaries, and neutral states alike—with the United States becoming what the scholar Stephen Walt has described in Foreign Affairs as a “predatory hegemon.” Trump’s policies have created a vast global geostrategic vacuum, tailor-made for China to take advantage of by expanding its own presence and influence. For Chinese strategists and diplomats, however, taking advantage of Washington’s unforced errors has proved easier said than done. China’s opportunities to broaden its global footprint and advance its interests vary by region and by domain, and its track record so far is mixed at best: some advances, some stasis, and some setbacks. At the moment, all eyes are on the important upcoming summit between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, which will take place in the shadow of the war in Iran. But the future course of the U.S.-Chinese competition will hardly be determined by one meeting. Far more consequential is the fact that for the past year, Trump’s actions and policies have created a golden opportunity for Xi and his government not only to advance their own interests but also to truly tilt the global balance of power. Yet instead of a strategic windfall for China, what has emerged is something more subtle: all over the world, countries are hedging, seeking to reduce their vulnerability to both China and the United States. This result is a reminder that U.S.-Chinese competition is not zero-sum. One country’s loss is not necessarily the other’s gain. And today, both may be losing global influence at the same time. In its geostrategic global competition with the United States, China utilizes a mixture of instruments to expand its footprint and advance its interests. These can be measured in four categories: diplomacy, soft power, military power, and economics. Diplomatically, China demonstrates an impressive presence and a high level of activity around the world. It has embassies and consulates in 182 countries, and its approximately 5,000 diplomats receive high marks for their knowledge and work. China’s ambassadors normally speak the languages of and give public speeches in the countries where they serve (in contrast with American ambassadors, who rarely do). The overall quantity of bilateral exchanges between China’s senior officials (including the head of state, Xi) and their counterparts is daunting, dwarfing that of the United States. Xi has traveled abroad somewhat less frequently in recent years than earlier in his tenure, but China can also dispatch its premier and four vice premiers, some of its 24 Politburo members, the state councilor for foreign affairs (the veteran diplomat Wang Yi), 26 departmental ministers, and various officials from the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party—all of whom regularly travel the world and receive foreign counterparts in Beijing. The Chinese government is also extremely active in international institutions and multilateral organizations, contrasting sharply with the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from 66 such bodies. Although China’s diplomatic footprint is broad, it is not necessarily impactful. Beijing is not driving the international diplomatic agenda, and it is not the most influential power in any region of the world. It never gets in the middle of the world’s most troublesome issues or conflicts, and it rarely brokers negotiations between contested parties (as is currently the case with the Iran conflict). Beijing tends to offer anodyne calls for peace and negotiation but rarely forges direct negotiations to truly resolve conflicts. This diplomatic disappearing act is symptomatic of China’s exaggerated sense of its own global power. China’s soft power remains similarly limited, despite Beijing pouring enormous resources (between $10 billion and $20 billion per year) into public diplomacy, global media, and overseas aid programs over the past decade in an effort to improve its poor image abroad. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has been more impactful, yet it too has produced mixed results. Relatively few people pay attention to the public statements of the Chinese government or to the activities of Xi’s many initiatives intended to build China’s influence: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, the Global Se

China Is Squandering a Golden Opportunity

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