The Achilles heel of national security

Asif Haroon Raja History teaches a harsh but enduring lesson: no external enemy can achieve its objectives without assistance from within. Betrayal, subversion, and collaboration with hostile forces have often proven more dangerous than direct military aggression. This reality is particularly evident in the history of nations confronted by prolonged external threats. In Pakistan’s case, the challenge is compounded by the hybrid warfare being waged by hostile actors, particularly India and, at various times, elements operating from Afghan soil. The threat escalated when Israel teamed up with India and Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan. Reportedly, the UAE has been secretly funding BLA and TTP to offset the development of Gwadar Port. The possibility of the US backing anti-Pakistan elements cannot be ruled out. The use of proxies, disinformation campaigns, economic pressure, and support for separatist or terrorist networks has become a preferred instrument of statecraft against Pakistan. One must ask whether terrorist organizations such as the TTP or separatist militant groups could sustain their activities without facilitators, sympathizers, financiers, and logistical supporters operating within the country. Terrorist violence does not occur in a vacuum. It requires funding channels, safe havens, intelligence leaks, recruitment networks, propaganda platforms, and political space. Foreign intelligence agencies have historically exploited local grievances, weak governance, and internal divisions to cultivate proxies that serve external agendas while disguising their true sponsors. Pakistan has paid an exceptionally heavy price for this phenomenon. Tens of thousands of civilians and security personnel have sacrificed their lives in a war largely fuelled by externally sponsored terrorism. Yet the damage has often been magnified by our own weaknesses: political expediency, lack of national cohesion, selective application of the law, and a tendency to appease disruptive