Mental causation is not load-bearing

In philosophy of mind, "mental causation" means mental entities have causal effects, especially physical ones. If physicalism is true, then physical effects are explainable in terms of physical causes (or at least, fundamental physical laws), needing no recourse to causation by anything that is not in fundamental physics. This is the "causal exclusion principle" explicated by Jaegwon Kim (and recently cited in "The Abstraction Fallacy..."), which suggests that, if physicalism is true, then mental entities cannot causally affect anything physical, except insofar as they are already physical entities. Substance dualists believe in mental causation rather straightforwardly: they believe that the soul has physical effects. Of course, substance dualism contradicts standard physics and physicalism. Type-identity physicalists believe that mental kinds reduce to physical kinds, and that as such, mental causation is a form of physical causation. Mental causation is contrasted with epiphenomenalism, a view under which physical causes can have mental effects but not vice versa. Epiphenomenalism (e.g. in property dualist form) faces a number of epistemic problems: Why did evolution create consciousness if consciousness has no physical effects? If our conscious experience has no physical effects, why would our reports about our experience correlate with our experience? Why are the physical-mental correlations the way they are, isn't this unparsimonious? Mental causation can help answer these questions. Mental causation can explain why minds have evolutionary utility, why mental facts correlate with reports about them, and why a unified explanation of physical and mental entities could be parsimonious. However, I suggest that mental causation is not essential to addressing these problems, and that intelligible supervenience of the mental on the physical matters more. By "intelligible supervenience", I mean that it is not mysterious why the physical facts imply the mental ones. Fo