The American Missile Crisis

Recent global conflicts, from Russia and Ukraine to Iran and Israel, have seen a resurgent awareness of the frailty of US munitions stock, which has been drawn down by both direct and indirect involvement in these events. While exact stockpile volumes are not disclosed, it is estimated that supplies of US warheads and the missiles that carry them have declined by nearly an order of magnitude since their peak during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Analysts have estimated that in the event of a conflict in the Pacific between China and Taiwan, US munitions supplies could be depleted in as few as three days, with some higher-tier terminal-phase missile supplies potentially depleted in the first 24 hours of conflict.

This was a foreseeable problem. Advocates for deterrence have supported expanding munitions stockpiles and accelerating production timelines for decades. While improving technical performance (precision and range) is useful, increasing attritable mass, or the volume of munitions that can be produced and pointed at a target set per year, is the actual measure of credible deterrence. And we have a critical bottleneck problem.

Historically, the decline of US munitions production capacity has been attributed to the bottleneck imposed by solid-rocket motor (SRM) casting, which only a handful of US companies are authorized to perform as of May 2026. The limitation on expanding solid rocket motor production is not inherent to the motor mechanics, but rather the fuel these motors use for power: ammonium perchlorate (AP). AP is the oxidizer that enables high-performance SRM in the inventory, bound with powdered aluminum (fuel) in rubber to form a controlled explosive. This fuel is cured inside motor castings for multiple days in heavily regulated environments designed to prevent cracks or voids in the cured grain that can cause the motor to over-pressurize and explode.