External success, internal breakdown

FROM March through April and into the present moment, Islamabad handled the Iran–US crisis with notable strategic discipline. Back channels remained active, neutrality was preserved across ports and airspace and energy flows were not disrupted. There were no sanctions, no escalation, no missteps. For a country often pulled into the gravitational field of other people’s conflicts, this was a clear demonstration of statecraft. Public approval reflected that success, with more than 70 percent backing the government’s approach. Yet overall approval has sunk to 29 percent. The explanation lies not in foreign policy but in something far more immediate and unforgiving, the electricity bill. Between June and December 2026, over 60 percent of Pakistan’s legacy Independent Power Producer contracts will expire. These agreements, largely originating from the 1994 and 2002 policy frameworks, account for around 7,800 megawatts of installed capacity. They are built on take-or-pay clauses and dollar-indexed capacity payments that guarantee returns regardless of actual generation. For decades, reform plans have pointed to a single solution, allow these contracts to lapse, retire expensive plants and shift to cheaper domestic power. That moment is now less than a year away, yet there is no clear public roadmap. The official position remains under review. Meanwhile, industrial consumers are preparing for the worst, budgeting for diesel-based generation in anticipation of shortages or costly last-minute extensions. The problem is structural. The expiring plants rely heavily on imported fuels. Around 42 percent run on imported RLNG, 35 percent on furnace oil and 11 percent on imported coal. Last year alone, Pakistan spent $18.7 billion on fuel imports for power generation. These costs flow directly into consumer tariffs through monthly adjustments. When the rupee weakens, electricity becomes more expensive. Extending these contracts would not just delay reform, it would lock in import d