Increasing nuclear risks

THE rapid transformation in international politics has systematically increased the nuclear perils. Strategic competition among the great powers led to the demise of the arms control architecture built over the last six decades. Moreover, the eleventh Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty failed to produce a consensus document that underscores the Treaty’s weakening and the surging risks of nuclear proliferation, the escalating dangers of nuclear proliferation and the heightened probability of nuclear weapons use. These definitely ring alarm bells about the “Sword of Damocles” that hung over the first nuclear age and has again hovered over the fourth nuclear age. There are sequential developments in the first half of 2026 that underscore the growing nuclear perils in the global strategic environment. Among them, four interlinked developments are remarkable. First, the expiration of New START—the last remaining major arms control treaty between the United States and Russia—in February 2026. It is the demise of the arms control architecture between Moscow and Washington, and the restarting of the deadly arms race between them. For instance, the Kremlin conducted a new nuclear-powered cruise missile test named Burevestnik on October 21, 2025, and a nuclear-powered autonomous super torpedo, named Poseidon, on October 28, 2025. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in its recent publication, drew attention to the increase in the potential use of nuclear warheads. Accordingly, of the total global inventory of an estimated 12187 nuclear warheads in January 2026, about 9745 were in military stockpiles for potential use, which is roughly 130 more than SIPRI’s estimate for January 2025. It also claimed that the nine nuclear-armed states—the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea), and Israel—continued to modernize their nu