Can the UAE Go It Alone?

ANDREW LEBER is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tulane University and a Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A Risky Quest for Strategic Autonomy in a War-Torn Middle East On the morning of April 8, a squadron of jet fighters struck oil refineries on Iran’s Lavan Island. The attacks came just before the cease-fire that would pause a weeks-long U.S.-Israeli air campaign against Iran, but according to a report in The Wall Street Journal, neither American nor Israeli planes were involved in the sortie. Instead, it was carried out by the United Arab Emirates, an oil-rich country just opposite Iran along the Persian Gulf. Although Emirati leaders have not publicly confirmed responsibility for the attack, the rationale for this strike and prior ones was clear. The UAE had endured weeks of Iranian drone and missile strikes, and it sought to deter further Iranian aggression by demonstrating its capacity to retaliate. Saudi Arabia has also retaliated against Iranian attacks, according to U.S. officials. But the UAE’s hawkish rhetoric during the war and the scale of its retaliation has distinguished its response from that of its neighbors. Over the course of the war, Emirati officials have touted their country’s resilience, its willingness to act, and its autonomy on the world stage. Anwar Gargash, the diplomatic adviser to the Emirati president, emphasized the need to confront Iran, which he called “the primary threat” to regional security. He lauded the “success of the UAE and its model” in withstanding Iranian attacks and asserted that the country would “continue to overcome challenges with confidence.” During the cease-fire, instead of hunkering down to await the outcome of U.S.-Iranian talks, the UAE chastised other countries in the region for failing to take decisive political or military action against Iran in the earlier phase of the war. Then, on May 1, Abu Dhabi withdrew from OPEC to detach Emirati oil policy from the decisions of the cartel. The UAE has long been an important regional player, but it wants recognition as a leading power on par with France or Japan—and it does not want a war in Iran to get in the way of that transformation. If anything, Iranian attacks in the Gulf have made Emirati leaders even more committed to their prewar strategy. At least while the war continues without a decisive resolution, the UAE is betting that closer ties with Israel, greater distance from other Gulf countries, and a tight alignment with the United States will help deliver security and influence and that economic expansion into parts of Africa will help deliver prosperity. But in the long run, this strategy risks alienating the UAE from the rest of the Gulf and making it more dependent on powerful partners—restricting the country’s options rather than raising its profile. For decades, the UAE has endeavored to use its position as a country with competent institutions in a chaotic region to raise its global standing. In security affairs, this meant deploying its small but capable military forces and its immense financial resources to support allies such as General Khalifa Haftar in Libya against Islamist movements whose ideas posed a threat to the Emirati monarchy’s hold on power. In economics, it meant using sovereign wealth funds and national corporate champions, such as the logistics firm DP World or the artificial intelligence giant G42, to attract trade, capital flows, and advanced technologies to Abu Dhabi and Dubai. And in its diplomacy, it meant presenting itself as the United States’ closest and most capable partner in the Gulf while quietly hedging, strengthening economic and technological ties to China and serving as a financial conduit for sanctioned Iranian and Russian capital. Emirati commentators often argue that big strategic bets, even if they risk short-term volatility, are necessary to protect the UAE in a neighborhood of crumbling states and outdated regional power structures. The political scientist Ebtesam al-Ketbi, for instance, has described the UAE’s interventions in Sudan, Yemen, and elsewhere as “managing disintegration to prevent total collapse.” A similar long-term logic guided the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020, which provoked regional backlash but also earned the UAE political capital in Washington and formalized its ties with the Middle East’s strongest military and only nuclear-armed state. Normalization with Israel is not the only unpopular Emirati policy. The UAE has backed the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary group that since 2023 has been fighting the Sudanese military in a horrific civil war. The country justifies its support for the RSF as a means of checking the influence of Islamist groups over the Sudanese Armed Forces, but ultimately it hopes for a friendly Sudanese government that will facilitate an Emirati economic and military presence in the Horn of Africa. In the meantime, Dubai’s g

Can the UAE Go It Alone?

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