Elusive normalisation

THIS month, mixed signals emanated from India on the normalisation of relations with Pakistan. Dattatreya Hosabale, secretary general of the Hindu extremist organisation RSS, proposed in an interview that the “window for dialogue” with Pakistan should always be open. He argued for diplomatic ties, visa issuance, trade and people-to-people contacts. His call was endorsed by several notables, including former Indian army chief (retd) Gen Manoj Naravane. Within days, as if to ensure that there was no confusion about the real Indian intent, the serving army chief Gen Upendra Dwivedi announced that Pakistan must decide whether it wants to remain a “part of geography or history” — hubristic rhetoric that reflected the hegemonic mindset of the Narendra Modi regime. ISPR strongly condemned these remarks, describing them as “madness and warmongering”. It is clear that the Modi government isn’t interested in normalising ties with Pakistan, and is engaged in creating a Hindutva-led polity in India. It uses anti-Pakistan rhetoric to fetch votes and remain in power. To that end, it has exploited the issue of terrorism to malign Pakistan and thus ‘justify’ its policy of a so far decade-long disconnect with Pakistan. After the Pahalgam terrorist attack in Indian-occupied Kashmir in April 2025, Prime Minister Modi authorised military strikes against nine non-military sites (mosques and allied schools) in Pakistan under the garb of fighting terrorism. To project resilience following India’s unilateral, illegal and brazen aggression, Modi announced three policy decisions — often described as the new Modi doctrine. According to this, the response to every act of terrorism in India would be severe military action against Pakistan; India would not distinguish between terrorism by a non-state actor and state-sponsored terrorism; and India would not be blackmailed by the threat of nuclear escalation. This meant that India would continue to expand space for kinetic confrontation with Pakis