A long war?

IT is becoming increasingly uncertain how long the Iran war, now in its third month, will last. Until recently, it seemed American and Iranian interests aligned in wanting to avoid a protracted conflict, although Israel’s didn’t. That impression gained strength when they held their first, and so far only, face-to-face talks in Islamabad last month. After that the peace process faltered and a second round of negotiations proved elusive, despite intense efforts by Pakistan, supported by key regional states. Pakistan’s active mediation subsequently involved exchanging messages and negotiating proposals between Tehran and Washington. That process continues. The ceasefire has held, which is positive. But it is a precarious truce in a volatile environment. The hardening public postures of both sides have impeded the search for an off-ramp from the crisis. President Donald Trump has oscillated between threatening to restart military operations and signalling openness to talks. This has made it difficult to ascertain what he really wants. It is one thing to use threats to mount pressure, but quite another when actions such as aggressive US enforcement of the blockade heighten the risk of renewed military confrontation. It also doesn’t help when he makes disingenuous claims such as Iran telling him it is in a “state of collapse”. Trump turned down the Iranian offer of a three-step plan to end the war as it sets aside the nuclear issue at the start to be addressed later. He has also rejected Tehran’s revised proposal. Meanwhile, Iran has used its leverage of control of the Strait of Hormuz to raise the costs of the war for the US, its Gulf allies and for the global economy. It has demonstrated it can wage an effective asymmetric war and absorb a high degree of pain from US-Israeli military strikes. Both the US and Iran are reluctant to demonstrate flexibility lest the other side construes that as weakness and a ‘win’ for itself. This is a recipe for the diplomatic impasse to