Prospects for peace?

IT is one of the enduring ironies in South Asia that even after stepping back from the brink of a potentially disastrous confrontation in May last year, India and Pakistan have been unable to move towards a meaningful dialogue. When announcing the ceasefire on May 10, US President Donald Trump congratulated both countries for showing “common sense and great intelligence”. Soon afterward, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Islamabad and New Delhi had agreed to begin talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site. Yet, one year later, those promised talks remain elusive. The brief triumph of pragmatism quickly gave way to familiar mistrust, hardened political positions, and strategic posturing. More strikingly, the international actors who had facilitated the ceasefire, including the US itself, showed little interest in converting crisis management into a structured peace process. The outcome is that, on the anniversary of last year’s stand-off, defence superiority is being projected by both countries through a verbal war. Though India rejected any prospects of talks with Pakistan after Rubio’s statement, a few attempts were still made to consolidate the ceasefire between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. This raised hopes that both might still be able to sit across the table from each other, even in the midst of the worst crisis. Similar optimism prevailed when the directors general of military operations of both sides effectively used the hotline, which has remained functional since 1971 and was established to help de-escalate crises. There is also some hope in India’s recent decision to let Pakistani sportsmen participate in international events on its soil, although bilateral sporting ties haven’t been restored. However, a more optimistic aspect is that both countries still interact, albeit in limited ways and mainly through informal diplomatic channels. After the crisis, at least four reported Track 1.5 and Track 2 meetings were held at different loc