Returns on multipolarity

GLOBAL politics is hurtling towards a multipolar system the likes of which we haven’t seen since the late 20th century. Several indicators bear this out: the global hegemon for the past four decades, the US, is experiencing a decline in its ability and willingness to project power outwards, as seen in its continued failure in Eastern Europe and the Persian Gulf, and in the increased reluctance and reticence of its allies to pick up its slack. Much of this decline stems from internal structural pressures: destabilising inequality, lopsided growth and investment confined to finance and IT, polarised elite factionalism, and a turn to racist nativism and insularity as the response to these problems. In the rest of the world, China’s stature as the premier industrial power remains uncontested, and its role as a provider of military prowess is growing rapidly. Coupled with Chinese liquidity generating debt and investment-based infrastructure partnerships in many parts of the world, the demand for foreign patronage and support is being met by a new supplier. Lastly, the institutional structures that generated order under unipolarity are themselves being hollowed out. Free trade stands abandoned by its erstwhile promoter, the US. There is increased scepticism around the strings that come with World Bank and IMF lending, and the UN along with any moral notion of international law was rendered thoroughly redundant during the livestreamed genocide in Gaza. The last pillar standing is the US dollar as the world’s currency but its role may diminish as currency-swap arrangements grow in popularity. What do these global transformations mean for countries like Pakistan? Subordinate within the existing global political system, does a new multipolar moment, especially one whose structures and norms are as yet unclear, signal prospects for positive change? To answer this question, one must hold a clear understanding of what positive change looks like in practice. To me, at least, this