The Repugnant Lifespan Conclusion

Certainty: Speculative moral philosophy. So, who knows! It's mostly unanswered questions anyways.Which would you choose, if you had to?1. Alice is born, and lives a happy life for 80 years2. Alice and Bob are both born, and live equally happy lives for 79 years.Intuitively, the second seems more appealing. A year of Alice's life is surely worth Bob's existence. But if you keep making choices like that, then you'd prefer that Alice, Bob, and Charlie are all born and live for 78 years. You can iterate, reducing how long everyone lives while increasing how many people there are... but then at some point you'd prefer a population where each person lives for (say) 1 minute (or one computation step[1]) over a single person living a full life. Surely this is silly? This is basically the repugnant conclusion applied to lifespans instead of happiness, but perhaps you bite that bullet but reject this one.Now consider what I'm currently calling the "FrankenWorm":[2] imagine a mind that simulates one minute of Alice, then one minute of Bob, then one minute of Charlie, etc. forever - never repeating someone twice.[3] Surely the worm has less moral significance than a normal person? This feels especially true if it only runs a single computation step of each person.Would you still love me if I was a FrankenWorm?Should we somehow treat the FrankenWorm differently from a population of people who all live short lives at once? I don't think so, but maybe you do - for example, perhaps some way of caring about continuity of experience would see the FrankenWorm as worse, due to constantly breaking the continuity in a way that a population of humans doesn't.If you're hung up on creation here (for example if you take the person-affecting view that it is not morally good to create people because nonexistence isn't bad "for anyone", as there isn't an "anyone"), you could alternatively imagine that Alice and Bob are both currently alive, but Alice has to spend a year of her lifespan to save