Iran’s war without winners

WHEN the United States and Iran agreed to end months of conflict, both governments rushed to declare victory. But if both sides claim to have won, who actually did? More importantly, at what cost? The war rattled the global economy. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted energy markets, drove up oil prices and placed immense pressure on economies worldwide, particularly developing nations. The eventual ceasefire, reportedly facilitated through Pakistani mediation, offered welcome relief. Yet it was less a triumph than an acknowledgment that neither side could sustain the conflict indefinitely. War by exhaustion: The United States emerged with depleted military stockpiles, having expended large portions of its precision missiles, THAAD interceptors and Patriot air-defense systems. Analysts estimate that replenishing these arsenals could take years. Iran faced an equally difficult reality. Its missile and drone attacks declined sharply as its own supplies dwindled. By the time negotiations began, both nations were running low on military options. Economic pressures added urgency. Rising energy prices, growing domestic criticism in the United States, reluctance among Western allies to deepen their involvement and mounting global concern all pushed Washington and Tehran toward diplomacy. The ceasefire was born not from decisive victory but from mutual exhaustion. Were the objectives achieved? The United States and Israel sought to cripple Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities while weakening its military infrastructure. Calls for regime change later entered the conversation. Iran’s objectives were different: preserve its nuclear program, maintain its deterrence capability and resist Israeli military dominance in the region. Neither side achieved everything it wanted. Israel demonstrated the effectiveness of its multilayered missile-defense systems, intercepting most incoming attacks while maintaining operational superiority. Yet Iran still managed to strike mil