For Israel, the Oct. 7 War Is Effectively Over

Get audio access with any FP subscription. Welcome to FP Free Week. To celebrate America’s 250th birthday, our entire site is completely unlocked this week only. Enjoy the article. Wars sometimes end decisively and sometimes peter out. In the case of the war that Israel has been fighting on multiple fronts since Oct. 7, 2023, there’s an argument to be made that it is now over—that it ended with the cease-fire signed between the United States and Iran on June 17. If so, this might be a moment for some accounting. How to evaluate these 984 days and assess what comes next? Of course, the fighting isn’t fully over. Israeli troops still occupy a little over half of the Gaza Strip and stage regular attacks on the rest of the territory. In Lebanon, the army occupies a “security zone” that extends some 6 miles deep into the country and regularly exchanges fire with Hezbollah. Israel continues to occupy a large chunk of the Syrian territory it seized shortly after the collapse of the Assad regime in 2024. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would like to resume the war on Iran with or even without the United States and may try to create enough trouble in Lebanon to disrupt the U.S.-Iran talks. Wars sometimes end decisively and sometimes peter out. In the case of the war that Israel has been fighting on multiple fronts since Oct. 7, 2023, there’s an argument to be made that it is now over—that it ended with the cease-fire signed between the United States and Iran on June 17. If so, this might be a moment for some accounting. How to evaluate these 984 days and assess what comes next? Of course, the fighting isn’t fully over. Israeli troops still occupy a little over half of the Gaza Strip and stage regular attacks on the rest of the territory. In Lebanon, the army occupies a “security zone” that extends some 6 miles deep into the country and regularly exchanges fire with Hezbollah. Israel continues to occupy a large chunk of the Syrian territory it seized shortly after the collapse of the Assad regime in 2024. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would like to resume the war on Iran with or even without the United States and may try to create enough trouble in Lebanon to disrupt the U.S.-Iran talks. Nevertheless, the odds of Netanyahu manipulating U.S. President Donald Trump back into a war are slim. The steady stream of threats Trump issued to bomb Iran into submission has long since ceased to be convincing; it is clear he wants to make a lasting deal, and so long as the Strait of Hormuz remains open, he’s willing to keep talking. Netanyahu has been very careful not to test Trump too much and risk a confrontation. And, as their relations grow increasingly strained, the prime minister’s room for maneuver has narrowed. Iran, for its part, has too much at stake with Hormuz and sanctions relief to let Netanyahu seriously disrupt its negotiations with Washington. When Hamas forced its way across the border from the Gaza Strip 32 months ago in a campaign of murder, pillage, and kidnapping, it was clear Israel would retaliate massively. It was not just a matter of revenge but the need to restore its shattered deterrence. The pre-Oct. 7 tactics of relying on intelligence to protect a lightly manned border and engage in periodic limited wars with Hamas (“mowing the lawn,” as it was known) had proved a failure. This time, Hamas would have to be eliminated as a fighting force. But the original mission quickly expanded in three directions. The first was driven by the far-right component of the Netanyahu government, which turned the assault on Gaza into a war of vengeance, conquest, and resettlement. It was no longer about defeating Hamas and rescuing the hostages held by the group but reversing what the far right regarded as the error of Israel’s original withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 and the dismantling of the settlements there. Starting sometime in 2024, the war became chiefly about making Gaza uninhabitable, clearing the way for permanent Israeli control and the return of the settlements. That meant perpetuating the assault long after its original purpose had been achieved, draining the army’s human and material resources and doing immense damage to the country’s international standing. Netanyahu repeatedly promised “total victory” against Hamas. Along the way, tens of thousands of Palestinians would be killed—mostly civilians. The war expanded in a second way, as Netanyahu and the army adopted a new, proactive (even aggressive) defense of Israel’s other borders. It wasn’t enough to contain the threat of Hezbollah and the militias in Syria because they, too, might attempt their own Oct. 7 rampages. Given the demands of the Gaza war, this took time to emerge, but when it did, it took the form of occupying parts of Lebanon and Syria, a campaign of assassinations against the Hezbollah leadership, and the infamous pager attack in September 2024. That facet of the war looked like an unalloyed victory when Hezbollah agreed to a

For Israel, the Oct. 7 War Is Effectively Over

Key takeaways

More in publications